LESSONS FROM IRAQ

In May 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority's (CPA) second de-Baathification directive abolished the Iraqi Army. This escalated tensions for U.S. forces in Iraq (with effects lasting long past the future 2011 withdrawal). Unsatisfied over periods without pay, ex-soldiers protested; some of which were deadly. Many also joined the growing insurgency. By June 2003, the U.S. planned on revamping a new Iraqi Army. In August 2003, the CPA's directive number 22 established the guidelines for a new Iraqi Army. The CPA also issued guidelines to train the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps and Iraqi Police. The CPA's role began to recede in Iraq by Spring 2004. In May 2004, Iraqi Army training was delegated to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). As a subcategory to the command structure, the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT) trained the Iraqi Army.

In June 2004, the Multinational Forces Iraq (MNF-I) was launched. Under the MNF-I, U.S. and Coalition troops continued training the Iraqi police and military. MNF-I was designed to organize command structure and meet objectives (counterinsurgency, security, rebuilding). CMATT was morphed under the Multinational Security Transition Command. Throughout 2004, MNF-I countries such as Spain and New Zealand withdrew troops from Iraq. Many trained Iraqis directly assisted U.S. forces. Even before MNF-I's activation, efforts to train Iraqis had significant setbacks. The growing insurgency caused U.S. leaders to request faster processes. To close 2004, MNF-I's successful major offensive was retaking Fallujah. In November 2004, U.S. Marines spearheaded an operation to clear Fallujah's heavy insurgent stronghold. 

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By 2005, the U.S. allotted $5.7 billion toward training Iraqi forces. Weapons sales totaled $132 million. U.S. training efforts wanted Iraqi forces to quell insurgencies. This meant that combat roles were intended to have majority Iraqis instead of U.S. troops. Despite that objective, the situation was the opposite. 2005 was the year the U.S. implemented "clear, hold, build". Iraqi forces and police units were not at effective combat readiness levels. There were even cases of desertion, compromisation, and disobedience. One notable incident was the first battle of Fallujah in April 2004, where Iraqi forces refused to fight alongside U.S. forces. By November 2005, U.S. strategy for securing Iraq still focused on increased training for Iraqi forces (military and police). 

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Sectarian violence in Iraq hit record levels in 2006. In February, the al-Askari Mosque (one of Iraq's holiest Shiite sites) was bombed. Shiite militias and insurgents then retaliated against Sunnis for the attack. Violence throughout Iraq became widespread. Deadly attacks killed scores of U.S. troops. Between the Sunnis and Shiites, three groups were responsible for instigating the deadliest attacks. Amongst Sunnis, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) under Abu Musab al-Zarqawi launched attacks to escalate sectarian violence and kill U.S. troops. Zarqawi's insurgency in Iraq began in Summer 2003. The Shiite militias such as the Mahdi Army led by Muqtada al-Sadr and Badr Brigade primarily targeted Sunnis. They also wanted to extend political control over Iraq. U.S. weapons shipments more than quadrupled when compared to 2005. In 2006, the U.S. sold $2.3 billion in weapons to Iraq. The Multinational Forces- Iraq (MNF-I)'s goals for the Iraqi Army were slipping. They planned for 10 combat ready divisions. Serious challenges concerning allegiance to militias was present in both the Iraqi Army and Police. There were many cases of U.S. troops frustrated with Iraqis not adhering to mission directives. 

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Iraq soon underwent a major transformation in Summer 2006. First, a U.S. airstrike eliminated AQI leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in June. Second, counterinsurgency began to shift in favor of MNF-I forces. Western Iraq's Anbar Province (which includes the Sunni Triangle) began to cooperate with U.S. forces. In Ramadi for example, U.S. counterinsurgency mirrored the official "clear, hold, build" strategy. After denying insurgents any passage into the city, U.S. and Iraqi forces set up combat outposts. By engaging with sheikhs, the U.S. established working relationships. This soon resulted in many joining Iraqi forces. Previously, AQI operated freely and had support from the locals. That was no longer the case. The Sunnis hunted down and killed AQI fighters. With substantial progress from the Sunni Awakening, the U.S. also rebuilt key infrastructure. Strategy-wise, U.S. military leaders found it advantageous as a method to convince the Sunnis their lives were improving. Close relationships with Sheikhs (most influential spiritual and community leaders) and imams were key to defeating Al-Qaeda in Iraq. To build trust, the U.S. also paid millions of dollars to sheikhs and tribal leaders. 

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In January 2007, the Surge began with 20,000 U.S. troops deployed to Iraq. To combat insurgents, U.S. and Iraqi patrols increased. The presence of forces was more common amongst the Iraqi populace. In February 2007, the U.S. launched Operation Fardh al-Qannon to secure Baghdad. Targets were AQI, Sunni, and Shiite insurgents. Many of the neighborhoods in Baghdad had Sunnis and Shiites living amongst one another. Discrepancies such as that escalated sectarian violence in Baghdad. Once U.S. and Iraqi forces cleared insurgents and segregated Sunnis and Shiites, violence began to decrease. In August 2007, Mahdi Army leader Muqtada al-Sadr announced a ceasefire. For the past several years, his militia directly opposed MNF-I forces. Despite the succeses of the Surge, 2007 was one of the deadliest years for U.S. troops in Iraq.  The Triangle of Death (south of Baghdad) emulated the challenges and intensity of counterinsurgency in an openly hostile enviornment. 

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