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AFGHANISTAN: AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL
On August 30, 2021 U.S. Forces officially left Afghanistan. Nearly three years later, the withdrawal continues to have serious impacts on America. As the Taliban rules Afghanistan for the first time since 2001, what is going on in Afghanistan? What is the threat to U.S. national security from a post-withdrawal Afghansitan?
EXPLORE THE TIMELINE: AFGHANISTAN POST-WITHDRAWAL TO PRESENT
AFGHANISTAN:
AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL
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U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY AFTER AFGHANISTAN: 2024
The threat from Afghanistan toward America supersedes initial predictions of a slow resurgence to pre-9/11 status. Since then, the Taliban formalized relations with China, and al-Qaeda continues to slowly (but quietly) gain momentum.
2001: U.S.-War in Afghanistan begins..
2011: U.S. Navy SEALs kill Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan..
2014: Operation Enduring Freedom Ends; Operation Freedom's Sentinel begins.
2021: U.S. withdraws from Afghanistan.
2024: Afghanistan recedes to pre-9/11 status, Taliban-China relationship solidifies.
THE TALIBAN'S VISION FOR THE WORLD
Image credit: CNBC/Getty Images
Taliban press conference in the Kabul airport on August 31, 2021: 24 hours after the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. Speaking is Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid (center).
Since the first international press conference in August 2021, Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid emphasized a new direction. He told the world the new Taliban would not be like the old.
For more than 25 years, the Taliban wanted international recognition. Their longstanding relationship with al-Qaeda resulted in sanctions, but ultimately war after 9/11. Terrorism is one of the top reasons why the world would not recognize or legitimize them. The Taliban remained neutral or denied questions about support for terrorist activity. Since the their founding, Pakistan's ISI and military supported them in the 1996 Afghanistan takeover. After 2001, ISI continued support for the Taliban through the 20 year Afghanistan War. The Taliban (to Pakistan) was beneficial to their interests.
From November-December 2001, the Taliban was overthrown from Afghanistan. In March 2002, U.S. and Coalition forces destroyed the last major stronghold of Taliban and al-Qaeda territory in the Shah-i-Kot Valley. In 2003, the Taliban began a gradual resurgence from Pakistan to Afghanistan. In 2006, their presence couldn't be ignored as attacks across Afghanistan skyrocketed. By 2011, U.S. troop deployments to Afghanistan peaked. Concentrating heavily on Kandahar and Helmand Province, the Taliban established strongholds in those territories. They also expanded in areas not held by U.S. and Coalition forces since 2002.
By the time of withdrawal in spring-summer 2021, the Taliban controlled large portions of Afghanistan. On May 1, 2021 the Taliban offensive to fully control Afghanistan began. In August, they quickly reclaimed Herat, Kandahar, Mazar-i-Sharif, and Kabul in less than one week. Note, this domino effect of major Afghan cities falling mirrors the November 2001 fall of major cities to U.S. and Northern Alliance forces.
On August 31, 2021 the Taliban had full control of Afghanistan for the first time in 20 years. This was 24 hours after the last U.S. forces left Afghanistan. As the world questioned what the Taliban would do next, they stuck to their original message: a new direction. In early September 2021, the new Taliban interim government took power. The Taliban continued to present messages of peace and hopes for a positive relationship with the world.
By fall 2021, the Taliban formally appealed to the United States and international community for aid and recognition. The United States provided aid to Afghanistan in the wake of natural disasters, but did not recognize them. Since 2022, The Taliban delegation attended many international summits focused on bolstering Afghanistan's economy. Countries such as China and Pakistan were key nations aiming to increase investment to Afghanistan. Despite agreements made, the Taliban has not been formally recognized. As of 2024, no country officially recognizes the Taliban.
Despite the Taliban's public messages, they continue receding to pre-9/11 status. The Taliban/al-Qaeda relationship continued to quietly fester. Even though the Taliban denied its existence, evidence proved their direct involvement in safeguarding/supporting al-Qaeda's presence. Additional questions spawned over the 2022 al-Zawahiri strike; since the al-Qaeda leader was in Kabul at the time. As of 2024, reports confirmed al-Qaeda training camps re-emerging in Afghanistan.
CHINA-TALIBAN RELATIONSHIP: A DANGER THROUGH 2024
Image credit: VOA
Assadullah Bilal Karimi, the Taliban ambassador poses with credentials at China's Foreign Ministry: December 1, 2023.
China held formal meetings with the Taliban as the U.S. withdrew from Afghanistan. From July 2021, China's footprint expanded toward Afghanistan without challenge. Three years prior, they secured the CPEC (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor) deal with Pakistan. Pakistan was the gateway to Afghanistan. During the 20 year war, Pakistan was a haven and active supporter of the Taliban and militancy against U.S. and Coalition forces.
China has several ambitions as it targets Afghanistan. With billions in lithium and raw materials, Afghanistan will benefit Chinese economic interests. By maintaining a positive relationship with the Taliban government, China can use Afghanistan to expand its influence (both diplomatic and economic). After the U.S. left Afghanistan, China hosted international bilateral meetings with the Taliban. Most of the focus was future investment and economic opportunities with Afghanistan. In May 2023, China planned a 'Belt and Road' style initiative for Central Asian countries such as Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan (all of which border Afghanistan). On top of that, Beijing operates a military base in Tajikistan. Throughout summer 2023, China announced large scale economic projects with Afghanistan and Central Asia. Beijing successfully completed an airline service that flies from Afghanistan to Xinjiang Province, China (where Ughyur genocide takes place). They also announced a rail network to Afghanistan that includes Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. These are a few examples of Chinese economic influence in Afghanistan and Central Asia after the U.S. withdrawal. Note that during the first several years of Operation Enduring Freedom (2001-2005), U.S. forces deployed to Afghanistan from K2 Airbase in Uzbekistan.
On a national security realm, this is concerning for the United States. While the Taliban maintains a quiet relationship with al-Qaeda, their open and strong relationship with China is dangerous. China is the top enemy to the United States of America. Beijing is responsible for direct actions that damage U.S. national security and endanger the American people. For example, spy balloons over American airspace (targeting military bases), farmland purchases near U.S. military bases, and operation of Chinese police stations in American cities. China is also is responsible for fentanyl exports and illegal alien smuggling through the U.S. border. Questions about China's link to terrorism and possible terrorist sheltering must be asked. Terrorists crossed illegally into the U.S.; China's operations at the border raise concern on whether there is a probable link.
As of fall 2024, no country formally recognized the Taliban government in Afghanistan. The only country with warm relations or a probable path to do so is China. They are the first country to establish a positive diplomatic relationship with the Taliban. In fall 2023, Beijing established a formal ambassador to Afghanistan; the Taliban also established theirs to China. Afghanistan's Taliban government even agreed to join China's Belt and Road Initiative. In February 2024, China formally accepted the Taliban ambassador.
HOW THE U.S. DEALS WITH THE TALIBAN POST-WITHDRAWAL
Image credit: Frontier Post
U.S and Taliban delegations meeting in Doha, Qatar. Notably pictured are U.S. Representative to Afghanistan, Thomas West (center right) and Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi (center).
After the 2021 withdrawal, the United States slowly warmed relations with the Taliban. The same disputes remained (just as they were before 2001). The Taliban's relationship with al-Qaeda fueled conflict with the U.S. Before 9/11, Afghanistan was a haven for al-Qaeda and various terrorist groups. The Taliban's support for them frustrated U.S. leaders. Osama bin Laden expanded al-Qaeda internationally while based in Afghanistan. After the U.S. Embassy bombings and U.S.S. Cole attack, capturing or killing bin Laden was a major concern for the U.S. By 2001, the terror threat to America from al-Qaeda was extremely high. Leading to September 11, the U.S. pressured Pakistan to convince the Taliban to dissociate al-Qaeda and extradite Osama bin Laden.
After 9/11, U.S. policy changed to an offensive anti-terrorism mode. Throughout the War in Afghanistan, the Taliban continued to support/fight alongside al-Qaeda with Pakistani assistance. After the withdrawal of U.S. forces, questions loomed how to handle the Taliban. The 2020 U.S.-Taliban agreement called for the dissociation and denial of terrorist havens in Afghanistan. Prior to the agreement, the Taliban controlled key areas of Afghanistan (most since their 2003 resurgence). In May 2021, they launched an offensive to reclaim the whole country. By August 15, they fully controlled Afghanistan once Kabul fell.
After U.S. forces withdrew on August 30, 2021, the future was bleak. The Taliban acquired surpluses of American weapons, military gear, and abandoned bases. There were U.S. citizens (who were not able to make it past the Kabul Airport gates) left behind.
In October 2021, the U.S. and Taliban held formal talks in Doha. The Taliban wanted (and continues) advocating for the United States to lift sanctions on Afghanistan and seek a path toward recognition. By late 2021, they appealed again to the U.S. and international countries for assistance (in the form of unfreezing assets and lifting sanctions).
The U.S. position on the Taliban continues to be over terrorism concerns, while the Taliban focuses on humanitarian issues. Both agree that Afghanistan is suffering catastrophic hunger and poverty. However, the method for dealing with the situation differs between both. In late October 2021, the U.S. approved the first aid package to Afghanistan post-withdrawal. In June 2022 and October 2023, the U.S. approved two more aid packages to Afghanistan after major earthquakes.
U.S. strategy toward the Taliban (post-withdrawal) is less intrigued than countries like Pakistan, China, or Iran. Although the U.S. approves aid packages under humanitarian grounds, they do not seek economic relationships or use Afghanistan for investment opportunities. Instead, the U.S. pursues a conditions based relationship (i.e., the Taliban complying with U.S. demands on terrorism support).
Non-conditions based countries like China took initiative with the Taliban in 2023 by constructing an airline, railroad network, and successful Belt and Road Initiative proposal. In November 2023, the Taliban and Iran signed economic agreements. In March 2024, the Taliban placed a $35 million investment into the Iranian Chabahar port. This will open the door for the Taliban's future access to international trade. As one of Iran's largest ports (located on the Gulf of Oman), the Taliban could eventually access trade routes in the Arabian Sea, Persian Gulf, and Indian Ocean.
AFGHANISTAN AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL: SUMMARIZING THE THREAT AND FUTURE OUTLOOK FOR 2025
Image credit: UnHerd/Getty Images
Taliban fighters holding a mix of their traditional weapons (AK-47s) and U.S. military weapons left behind during the 2021 Afghanistan withdrawal.
The Taliban is more international in 2024 than 2001. Though the ideology and desire for recognition remains the same, they are more ambitious post-withdrawal. Rather than relying on Pakistan for support/assistance, they have access to more countries. Investment opportunities and economic relationships give the Taliban more international exposure and a path toward eventual legitimacy.
China could replace Pakistan as the Taliban's chief stakeholder because of their direct economic interests in Afghanistan and bordering Central Asian countries. For the U.S., this is concerning for future Central Command (CENTCOM) operations. In 2001, U.S. forces used Uzbekistan's K2 airbase to launch direct combat operations in Afghanistan. Post-withdrawal, it will be much harder to secure a U.S. presence at or near Afghanistan due to China's overwhelming regional spread.
If the Taliban manages to bolster international trade (i.e., Chabahar port, etc.), U.S. pressure will be limited to sanctions. However, the U.S. will have to elicit more international pressure and stronger leverage to ward off more countries from direct economic relationships with the Taliban. Before 2001, Pakistan was the main supporting entity of the Taliban. 20 years later, China, neighboring countries, and Iran are using Afghanistan for diplomatic, strategic, and economic influence.
Assessing the outlook for 2025, the United States needs to fully understand Afghanistan's transformation post-withdrawal. The U.S. position must remain hardline against the Taliban's support for terrorism. However, the more interconnected the Taliban becomes globally, the harder it will be to contain the terror threat. U.S. policy will have to add more countries to sanction/block financing toward the Taliban.
As Afghanistan continues to recede to pre-9/11 status, the United States needs to continue monitoring China's strong and relationship with the Taliban. Al-Qaeda continues to use Afghanistan as a haven (just as before 2001). Any confrontation with Afghanistan or attempted pressure on the Taliban will likely involve a response from China.
The threat from ISIS-K is also of major concern for U.S. national security. Despite its hostility and direct conflict with the Taliban, their international threat remains uninterrupted. The Taliban (post-withdrawal) has been fighting against ISIS-K for nearly three years. Since then, ISIS-K managed to launch international attacks. Their largest was against Moscow in March 2024. The U.S. is concerned about impending ISIS-K attacks inside America. Though ISIS-K is based in Afghanistan, it is unlikely the Taliban would harbor them as al-Qaeda (whom they have a longstanding relationship with). The Taliban rejected U.S. intervention against ISIS-K in late 2021. If it reaches the point of the U.S. threatening intervention in Afghanistan, the Taliban would likely oppose on grounds of not needing U.S. involvement; but rather a matter that they themselves can "control". Meaning, the Taliban will present the ISIS-K threat as something that is not outside of their boundaries or capability to contain or defeat. The Taliban's likely position on ISIS-K should not be confused with their relationship or sanctuary for al-Qaeda.
On the American home front, terrorists (some since Operation Allies Welcome) came illegally through the border. China owns land near U.S. military bases and operates police stations in major cities. Vital national security question: are Chinese land purchases safe houses for terrorists who enter America illegally? Some of this eerily patterns behavior of al-Qaeda operatives while they were plotting and hiding in the shadows while in the United States.
The United States must also study and apply the lessons from the Afghanistan War (2001-2021): strategies, tactics, battles, geopolitics, and the decision making. Effective foreign policy requires historical application. For the Middle East, lessons overlap and repeat. Lastly, the U.S. must acknowledge that warfare in that region is not black and white. It is either fight forever or return to an even worse situation.
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